CodeWord Issue 41 - December 2015

The Takeovers Code and multiple offerors

Published 1 December 2015

The Panel has been considering the policy of the Code as it relates to multiple offerors in takeover offers for some time. There have been a number of takeovers where the offerors were current shareholders of the target company and structured the offer vehicle as an unincorporated joint venture, making the offer to all shareholders other than themselves. This has caused the Panel increasing disquiet that the policy of the Code may be undermined by these types of offer.

The Panel’s concern solely relates to how the rules of the Code are intended to apply – the Panel has no concern about the structure of the offer vehicle itself. The Panel’s view is that, read in light of the Code’s purpose, an offeror that is an unincorporated joint venture should be treated on a basis consistent with an offeror that is an incorporated joint venture.

This approach requires that the unincorporated joint venture must become the holder or controller of the voting rights of the joint venture participants, either in a manner permitted by the Code before the offer is made, or by the offer being extended to, and accepted by, the joint venture participants. The nature of the joint venture will determine the legal basis on which voting rights are held or controlled by it.

It is not sufficient for the joint venture participants simply to aggregate the total number of shares held by them (without any change in ownership status) and thereby have them count towards relevant thresholds, such as the 50% referred to in rule 23 or the 90% referred to in rule 50.

Acquiring the voting rights of the joint venture participants under the offer ensures that no side-deals can be made between co-offerors that would effectively see some shareholders receive a different deal. Rule 20 requires the same terms and considerations to be offered for all shares under the offer.

The Panel’s view regarding the proper, purposive reading of the Code also impacts on compulsory acquisition. In order for an offeror to proceed to compulsory acquisition under Part 7 of the Code, an offeror must first become the “dominant owner” of a Code company. Rule 50 defines “dominant owner” as “a person who ... becomes the holder or controller, or 2 or more persons acting jointly or in concert who ... become the holders or controllers, of 90% or more of the voting rights in the Code company (whether by reason of acceptances of an offer or otherwise)”.

For multiple offerors to become a dominant owner under rule 50, the participants that make up the offeror must be acting jointly or in concert to hold or control (again the nature of the offer vehicle will determine the legal basis of this) any shares accepted into the offer by third parties, as well as the shares held by the joint venture participants at the time of formation of the joint venture.

The Panel executive is available to confidentially discuss how the Panel’s policy may affect a specific or hypothetical circumstance.

Rule 25(1) and shareholder approval conditions in offers

Published 1 December 2015

Following the recent takeover offer by Briscoe Group Limited for Kathmandu Holdings Limited, the Panel has updated its Guidance Note on Offer Documents with guidance relating to the use of shareholder approval conditions in an offer.

The update provides that, in certain limited circumstances, it may be possible for an offer to be made subject to shareholder approval. In July 2015, Briscoe made a full takeover offer for Kathmandu. The offer was a major transaction for Briscoe and was conditional upon approval by the shareholders of Briscoe under section 129 of the Companies Act.

Briscoe sought to comply with rule 25(1) on the basis that irrevocable undertakings, in favour of, and enforceable by the Panel and Kathmandu, were given by:

  • Briscoe, to convene its shareholders’ meeting before the latest date by which the offer could be declared unconditional; and 
  • the shareholders who held more than 75% of the voting rights in Briscoe appointing a proxy and irrevocably instructing that proxy holder to vote in favour of the major transaction resolution at the shareholders meeting.

The effect of the undertakings was to eliminate the risk that the resolution could in effect allow Briscoe to have an option over the shares of Kathmandu.

Exemption where no information has been provided to any regulatory bodies

Published 1 December 2015

An amendment has been made to the Takeovers Code (Class Exemptions) Notice (No 2) 2001. New clause 25C grants an exemption from compliance with clause 14(3) of Schedule 1 of the Code in some circumstances.

Clause 14(3) of Schedule 1 of the Code requires an offeror to state that information provided in a takeover notice or offer document is consistent with information provided to other regulators. Clause 25C of the Class Exemptions Notice exempts offerors from having to make this statement if the offeror has not been required to give, and has not given, any information to any regulatory body, other than the Panel.

Update on Panel Members

Published 1 December 2015

The Panel is pleased to announce the appointment of Sacha Judd to the Panel from October 2015.

Ms Judd is the Managing Director of the Hoku Group, and a member of both the Institute of Directors in New Zealand and Institute of Finance Professionals New Zealand. Prior to her role at the Hoku Group, Ms Judd was a partner at Buddle Findlay, specialising in takeovers and corporate and securities law.

The Panel would like to acknowledge the work and contribution of Sue Suckling. Ms Suckling was a member of the Panel from 2002 until retiring from this role in August 2015.

David Jones, Roger Wallis and Simon Horner have been reappointed to the Panel for a further term.

Christmas closedown

Published 1 December 2015

The Takeovers Panel will be closed from 24 December 2015, and will reopen on 11 January 2016. Any enquiries during this period should be directed to takeovers.panel@takeovers.govt.nz

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