Guidance Note about the Role of Independent Advisers

for the purposes of the Takeovers Code

Third Edition

August 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE NOTE

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF ADVISERS

REPORTS REQUIRED IN RELATION TO TAKEOVER OFFERS

REPORTS REQUIRED FOR SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS UNDER THE CODE

CONCLUSION

PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE NOTE

1.
The purpose of this note is to assist those who are approved as independent advisers by the Panel for the purposes of a report under any of rules 18, 21 or 22 of the Code or under a class exemption or specific exemption granted by the Panel from the Code. It should be considered an aide memoire. It is not intended to be a prescription by the Panel as to the matters an independent adviser must address in any report prepared for the purposes of the Code. It is expressed in general terms only and should not be regarded as comprehensive in any particular case. It should not be regarded as definitive and may be amended by the Panel from time to time.
2.
This is the third edition of the guidance note and replaces the previous edition issued by the Panel in July 2003.
3.
The Code requires the adviser to give an assessment of the "merits" of the particular offer (takeover), acquisition (share transfer or buyback), or allotment from the point of view of the recipient (in the case of a takeover offer) or of the person who is required to vote on the proposal (acquisition or allotment).
4.
Philosophically the Code is concerned with the effect of changes in control between recognised points - 20% to 50%, 50% to 90%, and above 90%. The Code provides rights for shareholders at each stage. A primary focus of a Code report would often be the merits of incremental changes in voting control. These issues may have particular relevance in changes of control in the 20% to 50% zone which was recognised in formulating the Code as a critical area.
5.
The Panel believes that an important role of the independent adviser is to advise shareholders of their rights under the Code, and suggests the adviser should be careful not to imply a proposal is meritorious, particularly in the 20% to 50% zone, simply because there are few negatives. It may well be that continuation of the status quo is the more desirable outcome unless there are good reasons why the shareholders should vote to approve a departure from it.
6.
The Panel has for some time now been reviewing advisers' reports in draft form before they are finally distributed to shareholders. This process prompted the Panel to prepare the earlier versions of this guidance note. Recent developments in the market have prompted the Panel to issue this updated version.
7.
The matter of original concern to the Panel was that advisers did not always inform shareholders of the protections and rights available to them under the Code or of the options available to the acquirer/bidder as a result of the Code. These issues have been largely addressed by advisers in their reports over the past two to three years. The issues which have prompted this revision of the guidance note include:
(a)
A concern that independent advisers may be allowing their independence to be compromised in their use of subcontractors to undertake adviser assignments under the Code1;
(b)
The need for some clarification in relation to the independence of advisers preparing reports in relation to successive takeovers occurring in close proximity to each other2;
(c)
There has been an excessive concentration on the "fairness" of transactions, particularly takeovers, by advisers in their reports at the expense of a balanced consideration of the merits of a transaction3;
(d)
The need for some clarification in the guidance note in relation to partial offers4.
8.
In all cases the report must be an independent adviser's report and as such the directors of the target company, the offeror, the acquirer, the seller, the allottee or the allottor should not influence the findings or the choice of subcontractor, should one be needed.
9.
The Panel does not wish to prescribe the meaning of "merits" in relation to any particular transaction and nor does it wish to express a view of various valuation methodologies. The Panel makes the following suggestions in relation to some of the types of report that an adviser may be called on to complete.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF ADVISERS

10.
Independent advisers' reports play an important role in the scheme of the Code. The Panel takes its responsibilities for approving the appointment of independent advisers very seriously. Frequently, because of the timeframes stipulated in the Code, the approval of the appointment of the adviser by the Panel, and the preparation of the report itself, have to be undertaken in very compressed time periods. This has a number of implications:
(a)
When making application to the Panel for approval as an independent adviser it is important that the application is complete in all respects. The Panel's policy for the approval of independent advisers is set out on its website at www.takeovers.govt.nz;
(b)
It is important that the adviser has the skill base and resources available to it to complete all the work necessary to finalise its report to an appropriate standard in the limited time available;
(c)
It is also important that the target or subject company itself has the information and personnel available to provide the independent adviser with the information necessary to complete its report, and also has the resources to be able to respond to the report itself.
11.
The process of preparing and distributing independent advisers' reports within the timeframes stipulated in the Code (at least in relation to takeover offers) creates a tension between providing a report that is sufficiently comprehensive so that the target company shareholders are well-informed, while also providing the directors of the target company with enough time to give full consideration to the contents of the report. This underlines how important it is for the adviser, and the target company, to be adequately resourced to cope with their responsibilities and deal with any issues that are necessary.
12.
In some cases the firm putting itself forward for approval as an independent adviser for a particular takeover or other Code transaction will not have the necessary expertise to deal with all aspects of the adviser assignment. In such cases the primary adviser may need to engage the specialist services of a subcontractor to assist with aspects of its report.
13.
The Panel considers the appointment of the proposed subcontractor at the same time that it is considering the application for approval from the primary adviser.
14.
The Panel would expect the adviser to satisfy itself that the subcontractor it wishes to use has the necessary expertise and independence to undertake the assignment. Advisers must choose their own subcontractors and not allow the target company or any other party to choose a subcontractor for the assignment. In order to maintain the desired level of independence the Panel considers that the work of the subcontractor should be managed by the primary adviser and not, for example, by the target company or bidder.
15.
Although the Panel approves the lead firm as the independent adviser for the purposes of the transaction, any such approval will also incorporate reference to any particular subcontractor that is to be used for the assignment.
16.
Another issue key issue for the Panel is the independence of the proposed adviser
17.
While some precluding interests are obvious, one which has arisen recently and which may not be so apparent concerns requests to approve the same adviser for successive, or follow-on, takeover offers involving the same parties.
18.
As part of its overall consideration of an adviser's application one issue that the Panel will have to consider in such cases is the independence of the adviser if the same adviser were to be approved to prepare the follow-on rule 21 report. Factors the Panel is likely to consider could include:
(a)
The proximity of the preparation of the two reports;
(b)
Whether this is likely to be the last independent adviser's report to be provided to shareholders before compulsory acquisition is initiated;
(c)
Whether the business, circumstances or prospects of the target company have changed between the two reports;
(d)
The relationship between the value given in the adviser's first report and the offer prices under each offer;
(e)
Whether the shareholders are likely to benefit from having an independent adviser's report prepared by a different advisory firm from that which prepared the first report.

  1. See paragraph 12 onwards for discussion of this issue
  2. See paragraph 16 onwards for discussion of this issue
  3. See paragraph 29 onwards for discussion on this issue
  4. See paragraph 43 onwards for discussion of this issue