the Panel's application to be heard and opposed the amended orders the Panel was seeking.

The parties obtained an urgent Court fixture because Dominion Group's documentation was about to be posted to shareholders. The matter was heard in the High Court in Auckland on 17 and 18 October 2006 before Stevens J.

HIGH COURT DECISION

Stevens J issued an oral judgment on the afternoon of 18 October 2006. This was followed by his written reasons on 20 October 2006.1

The first order made was that the Panel was granted leave to be heard on the application, being a person “interested” in the proposed amalgamation.

His Honour observed [para 53] that the approach of the Courts to questions of standing has tended over the years to follow a liberalising trend. Stevens J noted that the Court would be infl uenced by the nature of the issues for decision and the type of assistance available from the party seeking to be heard. The characteristics of that party, including its own objects, purposes, functions and expertise, would also be relevant. Each case would be considered on its merits and in the light of all the circumstances of the case. His Honour said:

“A reasonable touchstone seems to me to turn on the ability of the party seeking to be heard to provide relevant and meaningful assistance to the Court on the issues for decision. In other words, can it genuinely assist the Court on the matter for decision?”

Stevens J cited with approval a passage from Professor Joseph's text on Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 2001) at 1008 which concluded with a quotation from Cooke J:

“Any tendency to consider the issue of standing in insolation [sic] from the nature of the complaint is resisted.” Standing was to be decided “on the totality of the facts.”

His Honour said [56]:

“In the context of an amalgamation under Part 15 of the Act, where the Court has a supervisory role, I consider that a similarly broad view should be taken to the question of standing. If one looks at the issues which the Court must consider under s236 of the Act, there may well be circumstances where it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to be assisted in how it might exercise the wide discretionary powers which arise with a body with the expertise of the Panel.”

He concluded [59]:

“In this case, the Court determining issues under s236 of the Act has a broad supervisory jurisdiction, and must consider a range of discretionary factors. I have been assisted by hearing from the Panel about matters within its area of expertise. I have had an opportunity to consider the additional factual material placed before me and the submissions and arguments of counsel, particularly where, as here, it is limited to a procedural issue. I also consider that, had this information and arguments (from both sides) been available to the Judge [Asher J] who considered the ex parte application and made the initial orders, it would have materially assisted him in the exercise of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, I consider that the Panel should be granted leave to address matters of relevance to the principles which apply to an amalgamation under Part 15 of the Act.”

The second order made set aside one of the Court's original orders relating to the quorum of voters required to vote on the amalgamation resolution. A new order was substituted requiring the amalgamation resolutions in each company to be approved by voters representing a majority of the total voting rights in each of the applicant companies. A third order set out arrangements to notify the Panel of the result of the voters' poll.

His Honour addressed several issues in deciding that the Court could make new orders and set aside some of the Court's original orders under s236 of the Act.

The first issue concerned the scope of the Court's powers under Part 15 of the Act. Asher J made the initial orders on 21 September 2006 under s236 of the Act. The principles applied by Asher J in making the initial orders were as set out in Re C M Banks Ltd [1944] NZLR 248 and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Weatherston v Waltus Property Investment Limited [2001] 2 NZLR 103.

The principles set out in Re C M Banks Ltd are that:

“The duty of the Court is to see (1) that there has been compliance with the statutory provisions as to meetings, resolutions, the application to the Court, and the like; (2) that the scheme has been fairly put before the class or classes concerned; and that if a circular or circulars have been sent out, as is usual, whether before or after the making of the application to the Court, they give all the information reasonably necessary to enable the recipients to judge and vote upon the proposals; (3) that the class is fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and
 
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