Table 3. Summary assessment of the options vs. Status Quo |
Objectives |
1. 'Anti-avoidance of Code' provision in Companies Act |
2. Exempt from Code |
3. Bolster Companies Act |
4. No Part 13 Amalgamations |
5. No Part 13/15 for Code Companies |
Efficient allocation |
Should improve information. |
Little effect. Panel activism may improve information. |
Little effect. Should improve information. |
Little effect: firms can switch to Part 15. Panel role in Court may improve information |
Would stop or discourage some efficiency improving reconstructions. |
Competition for control |
Potential deterioration, as may raise entry barriers and transaction costs to address requirements. |
Potential marginal improvement as legal certainty could encourage greater use of reconstruction provisions. |
Marginal deterioration if requirements to change control are made slightly more onerous. |
Marginal deterioration as it removes a potentially less onerous route under which to change control. |
Marginal deterioration as it removes potentially less onerous routes for changes in corporate control. |
Fair treatment |
Potential improvement if Panel activism results in equivalent consideration and higher voting thresholds. |
Potential deterioration as certainty could encourage greater use of reconstruction provisions. |
Potential improvement if threshold and/or information changes improve participation. |
Marginal improvement, if it raises the test for compulsory acquisitions under amalgamations (under either Code or Court-approved scheme). |
Improvement as all takeover proposals involving Code companies would be subject to Code. |
| International competitive capital markets |
Unclear. Potential improvement if Court involvement by Panel improves the perception of market integrity, but may raise transaction costs; however,
closer alignment with Australian requirements. |
Potential deterioration, as it may increase the perception of risk, but greater certainty of available routes allows least cost option to be chosen.
|
Unclear. Possible improvement if changes perception of uncertainty or other negatives. But could increase transaction costs by raising process
requirements. |
Unclear. Reduces uncertainty somewhat but at the same time it may raise the transaction costs of participating in takeovers. |
Unclear. Reduces risk perception but at the same time it may raise the transaction costs of participating in takeovers. |
Autonomous decisions |
Potential improvement, as it results in higher voting thresholds under reconstructions. |
Potential for some deterioration if greater use of reconstruction provisions. |
Improvement through changes in voting thresholds when Code companies are involved. |
Potential improvement for amalgamations, but potential to switch to Part 15 provisions. |
Improvement through changes in voting thresholds when Code companies are involved. |
Reasonable compliance cost |
Increased Court involvement by Panel raises direct costs for bidders and the Panel. Potential increased enforcement by MED raises costs. |
Increased Court involvement by Panel raises direct costs for bidders and Panel. Potential increased enforcement by MED raises costs. |
Possible increases if process is more expensive. |
Potential for increased costs as any switch of forums (to Code or Scheme) increases costs for the Panel. |
May increase costs if switch from reconstruction provisions to Code increases Panel activity. |